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HEAR NO EVIL, SEE NO EVIL... SPEAK NO
EVIL? A RE-EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
Erika Eisenoff
INTRODUCTION
"I've been asking to replace the fire fighters here in the Town
over the last five years and it seems to have fallen on deaf ears. As many
of you are here today you have the resources to bring this information to
the public."' These were the comments Charles D. Foley, Chief of the
Fire Department in Randolph, Massachusetts, made at a press conference
held shortly after the Department's early morning efforts to put out a
tragically fatal house fire that claimed the lives of two children trapped
inside.2 With a captive audience, Foley, though not required to speak,
seized the opportunity to voice his concerns to the town after prior futile
attempts at communication. Hoping to receive an increase in manpower
and funding, what Foley got instead was a fifteen-day suspension
without pay. Despite Foley's claim that his superiors had retaliated
against him for the statements he made as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, the First Circuit held that Foley's choice to comment to the
press was actually part of his "official job duties" and received no First
4Amendment protection.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,5 the Supreme Court held that public
employee speech does not garner protection under the First Amendment
when the employee is speaking pursuant to his or her official capacity.
The Supreme Court, however, declined to delineate any type of
framework that would prove useful to lower courts when assessing
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012.
1. Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 10.
5. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
6. Id. at 424-26.
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whether speech could be fairly attributed to one's official duties. As a
result, this decision has left a wide array of speech unshielded from
employer discipline, depending on how courts choose to define what
amounts to "pursuant to [one's] official responsibilities."' Because the
Court in Garcetti noted the lack of constitutional protection afforded to
this type of speech but declined to articulate specific criteria that would
give lower courts any guidance as to when an employee was speaking
pursuant to his or her official duties,9 lower courts have essentially been
given free rein to interpret Garcetti as narrowly or as broadly as they so
choose. Many circuit courts have erroneously interpreted Garcetti as
enunciating a wholly new bright-line rule that greatly expands the rights
of the public employer by finding that any speech related to one's job is
made pursuant to one's official duties.'o Decisions then hinge on this as
the dispositive factor, dismissing the First Amendment retaliation claim 11
and never applying the more speech-protective Pickering-Connick
balancing testl regardless of whether the employee could have been
speaking as a citizen or on a matter of public concern. A few circuits,
however, opt to scrutinize the "content, form, and context"' 3 of the
speech before making a blanket assumption that it was made pursuant to
one's official duties.14
7. Id. at 424.
8. Id. at 411.
9. Id. at 424-25 ("Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform.").
10. See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 5-6 (2010) (holding that
when employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment).
11. Public employee free speech cases most commonly arise in a retaliation
context, in which an employer implements disciplinary action against the employee
after that employee has spoken in a way that the employer deems unacceptable for
the workplace environment.
12. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). Under this test, an
employee's statements made as a citizen touching on matters of public concern are
then weighed against the employer's right to an efficient, disruption-free workplace.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138-39 (1983).
13. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
14. See, e.g., Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2009) (analyzing
the content, form, and context in which a police department employee gave
information to the media to determine if the speech was made pursuant to the
employee's official duties); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 544-45 (9th Cir. 2006)
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The purpose of this Note is to explore the discrepancies
surrounding how much protection the First Amendment affords to public
employee free speech by examining the circuit split that has developed
since the 2006 Supreme Court decision of Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the Pickering-
Connick balancing test courts employ when assessing First Amendment
claims by public employees and analyzes the Supreme Court's decision
in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Part II highlights the circuit split that has
developed as a result of the questions Garcetti left unanswered,
contrasting the broad interpretation of "pursuant to official duties" used
by the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits with the Fourth
Circuit's more narrow examination of the content of the speech and the
employee's role when speaking. Part III looks at both the legal and
policy reasons why the Fourth Circuit's presumption of narrowly
interpreting Garcetti and its adherence to balancing the interests of the
public employee and the government is preferable. This is especially true
where, unlike in Garcetti, the parties disagree as to whether the
employee spoke in his or her official capacity. Part IV offers guidance on
how to define when speech is pursuant to one's official duties and argues
that speech directed toward the press is almost never appropriately
classified as such. This Note concludes that the other circuits should
adopt the Fourth Circuit's narrow application of Garcetti in the interest
of uniformity, fairness, and staying true to the holdings of Garcetti,
Pickering, and Connick.
I. PICKERING, CONNICK, AND GARCET77
It is a well-settled principle that "[t]he First Amendment 'was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people."' 15 Therefore, when
speech touches upon societal and community concerns, courts must be
(analyzing the content, form, and context of a corrections officer's speech to
determine if it was made pursuant to her official duties).
15. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[s]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.")
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careful to give that speech the protection it warrants in light of this long-
accepted concept of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address this "core
value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment"' 6 in its
decision in Pickering v. Board of Education.'7 In Pickering, a public
school teacher was dismissed after he sent a letter to the local newspaper
in response to new tax proposals. In his letter, he criticized how the
school board and the superintendent had utilized revenue in the past.19
He was subsequently discharged from his position after the Board
determined his letter undermined the "efficient operation and
administration of the schools."20 In examining Pickering's claim that his
dismissal for writing the letter to the newspaper violated his First
Amendment free speech rights, the Court recognized the significant
interests of both parties, noting "[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."21 In applying this balancing test, the
Court ultimately held that the school administration's interest in limiting
an employee's ability to participate in public debate did not prevail over
the employee's First Amendment right to engage in such debate.22 The
Court did make a point of noting, however, that a public employee's
right to free speech was not absolute and set forth a preliminary outline
of sorts to instruct courts on how to undertake the analysis of the
23
competing interests at stake. Balancing the interests in Pickering,
specifically, the Court asserted that while Pickering's statements were
critical of the Board of Education, the fact that they were directed to the
16. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
17. Id. at 574-75.
18. Id. at 564.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 568.
22. Id. at 574-75. However, the Court did not suggest that this would always
be the outcome when applying this balancing test. Id. at 569.
23. Id. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.").
646 [Vol. 9
2011] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 647
general public via the newspaper and not made directly to his coworkers
or superiors suggested a lack of real detriment to his ability to perform
his assigned routine tasks or to function in the workplace environment in
general.24 To the contrary, the Court stressed the importance of the
letter's purpose as a means of promoting "free and open debate ... vital
to informed decision-making by the electorate" to tip the scales of the
25
competing interests in Pickering's favor.
The cases that followed Pickering gave the Court ample
opportunity to apply its new method of balancing.26 Fourteen years later,
the Court reaffirmed its Pickering balancing test in its decision in
Connick v. Myers.27 In Connick, an assistant district attorney, unhappy
with a transfer to a different section of court, distributed a questionnaire
asking her coworkers' opinions regarding the office transfer policy and
28
other office concerns. She was terminated shortly thereafter because
she refused to be transferred and her questionnaire was deemed "an act
of insubordination." 29 The Court recognized that the First Amendment
could potentially protect Myers' questionnaire. 3 0 The threshold question
was whether the questionnaire commented on a matter of public
concern. 3 1 Distinguishing matters of public concern from private ones
24. Id. at 569-70.
25. Id. at 571-72 (noting that Pickering's position as a teacher gave him
invaluable insight and information regarding the allocation of funds).
26. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)
(holding that the First Amendment protects private speech between a public
employee and employer where that speech involves a matter of public concern); Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (vacating and remanding a
case where it was unclear whether a public school teacher's dismissal had resulted
from his dissemination of a memorandum to a local radio station); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (finding "a bona fide constitutional claim"
when a college system failed to rehire an employee after he spoke to the state
legislature critically about the Board of Regents' policies).
27. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
28. Id. at 141.
29. Id. at 140-41.
30. Id. at 142 ("For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes on the employee's
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.").
31. Id. at 146-47 (noting that employers have broader discretion in imposing
employee disciplinary actions when an employee's speech does not involve a matter
of public concern).
requires the Court to examine the "content, form, and context" of the
speech itself.32 Although the Court determined that Myers' questionnaire
largely was not of public concern, one question did involve a matter of
public concern,34 and the Court thus sought to balance the competing
interests of Myers and her employer. 3 5 The Court found that the limited
public concern raised by the questionnaire did not outweigh the district
attorney's reasonable concern that the questionnaire would "disrupt the
office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working
relationships." 36
In subsequent years, the Court continued to apply the Pickering-
Connick balancing test.3 Though the Court acknowledged the difficulty
of engaging in balancing the interests of the government and public
employees, it found it necessary to do so in order to afford proper
consideration to two competing yet legitimate interests.3 8 Despite the
Court's clear assertion of the need for balancing, its unwillingness to
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 148 (finding that "the questionnaire, if released to the public, would
convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with
the status quo").
34. Id. at 149 ("One question ... does touch upon a matter of public concern.
Question 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys 'ever feel pressured to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates."').
35. Id. at 150 (noting that the government has an interest in "the effective and
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public").
36. Id. at 154.
37. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454
(1995) (striking down a congressional act that prohibited employees from receiving
an honorarium for speeches made or articles written outside their employment);
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (holding that an employee's criticisms of
workplace conditions made to a coworker were not a matter of public concern and
did not outweigh the interests of his employer); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987) (finding that an employee's free speech interest in speaking about Reagan's
assassination attempt outweighed her employer's disciplinary action for her
statements).
38. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (2008). While the Court in Connick
noted that it was neither "appropriate [n]or feasible to attempt to lay down a general
standard against which all such statements may be judged," it maintained the
importance of engaging in its balancing test because of the "longstanding
recognition that the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech
upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the
administration of a government office." Id.
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espouse a general rule3 9 regarding the proper weight to afford the
interests of government employers or their public employees left open a
wide window of opportunity for interpretation.40 Subsequent cases have
employed the Pickering-Connick balancing test, albeit with slight
variations by virtue of the amorphous guidelines given to the lower
courts. The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos4 1 is
but one example of adjusted balancing based on the specific facts of the
case42 and did not change the balancing analysis established in Pickering
and Connick.43
Garcetti centered around a disposition memorandum supervising
deputy district attorney Richard Ceballos wrote in which he claimed an
affidavit police had used to obtain a search warrant contained serious
misrepresentations and recommended dismissal of the case.4 Prior to
writing the memorandum, the defense attorney for an upcoming case
asked Ceballos to look into alleged inaccuracies in the affidavit because
Ceballos was a calendar deputy with certain managerial duties over other
attorneys during this time.45 Ceballos' superiors at the sheriffs
39. Id. at 147-48. It is worth noting that while the Court was hesitant in both
Pickering and Connick to assert any kind of bright-line rule, the Connick Court did
offer the following guidance for determining whether an employee's speech touched
on a matter of public concern: "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id.
40. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (noting that leaving
the balancing test open to interpretation, while inevitably creating more work for
lower courts attempting to apply the test, was necessary in order to properly assess
"the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teachers and
other public employees may be thought by their superiors ... to furnish grounds for
dismissal").
41. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
42. The Court in Garcetti indicated that whether Ceballos was speaking
pursuant to his employment duties was a threshold question to the balancing analysis
in light of the particular facts of the case. Id. at 410-12.
43. In their petition for writ of certiorari, petitioners argued that immediate
review was necessary because of inter-circuit disagreement regarding whether the
First Amendment protects job-related speech, explaining that lack of uniformity in
the decisions made it difficult for government employers to efficiently manage the
workplace. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
(No. 04-473), 2004 WL 2260964.
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14.
45. Id.
department were displeased with Ceballos' action and decided to
46
prosecute the case, ignoring Ceballos' recommendation. At a hearing of
the case, Ceballos was called to testify for the defense to recount his
opinions in the disposition memorandum. 47 Ceballos claimed that after
the hearing, his superiors took retaliatory action against him for writing a
memo that exposed the errors of the affidavit and recommended
dismissal of the case, thereby violating his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.48 The procedural history of the Garcetti case alone
highlights the difficulties courts already had in applying the Pickering-
Connick balancing test. 49
When the case got to the Supreme Court, a 5-4 majority decision
narrowly reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that Ceballos'
disposition memo was not protected by the First Amendment because he
wrote it as part of his job requirements as calendar deputy. The Court
reasoned that when public employee speech is the product of an
employee acting in his or her official capacity, it is not citizen speech,
thus implicating no First Amendment rights.
Notwithstanding the ultimate outcome in Garcetti, the principles
guiding the analysis of public employee free speech that had been
established and accepted prior to Garcetti were not fundamentally altered
46. Id. at 414.
47. Id. at 414-15.
48. Id. at 415. Some of the retaliatory actions alleged included reassignment to
a trial deputy position, transfer to a different courthouse, and not getting promoted.
Id. at 415.
49. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that
although Ceballos' memo was about a public concern, he wrote it pursuant to his
official duties and was therefore not protected under the First Amendment. Ceballos
v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
2002). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then reversed, applying Pickering
and Connick and finding that Ceballos' memo touched on a matter of public concern
(governmental misconduct). The Ninth Circuit then concluded that petitioners
"failed even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District
Attorney's Office" while Ceballos had clearly set forth his First Amendment rights.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). However, Judge
O'Scannlain wrote a concurring opinion in which he asserted the Ninth Circuit had
misapplied Pickering, giving too much weight to the fact that Ceballos' memo
touched on a matter of public concern. Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1187 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
50. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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by the literal holding of the Garcetti decision itself. Despite the Court's
finding that the First Amendment did not protect Ceballos' memo, the
Court did not change the inherent structure of the Pickering-Connick
balancing test upon which lower courts had come to rely for so many
years.5' The Court upheld the test as follows:
Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify
two inquiries to guide interpretation of the
constitutional protections accorded to public
employee speech. The first requires determining
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a
matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the
employee has no First Amendment cause of action
based on his or her employer's reaction to the
speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of
a First Amendment claim arises. The question
becomes whether the relevant government entity
had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the
general public.52
The Court did not have to broach the second inquiry because it
first determined that Ceballos was not speaking as a citizen when he
wrote his disposition memo. However, the Court was careful to stress the
importance of both the government's interests and the public employees'
interests, despite coming out in favor of the government employer in this
particular case." Additionally, the Court maintained the underlying
rationale for the purpose of engaging in the delicate balancing of
interests where appropriate.54 Unfortunately, acknowledging these
51. The Court in fact noted that "Pickering provides a useful starting point in
explaining the Court's doctrine." Id. at 417.
52. Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 419 (noting that a public employee is still a citizen retaining certain
fundamental rights that cannot be restricted by a governmental employer while the
government must also retain a certain amount of control over its employees to ensure
efficient and effective operations).
54. The Court, referring to Pickering and the cases decided in its wake, said:
The Court has acknowledged the importance of promoting the
public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of
government employees engaging in civic discussion . . . . The
Court's approach acknowledged the necessity for informed,
652 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
principles, yet finding that Ceballos wrote his memo because it was "part
of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do,"" seemed to leave
the issue of what extent public employees' speech is afforded First
Amendment protection in even more of a gray area than before
Garcetti. The fact that the Court also explicitly declined to explain how
lower courts should proceed when "defining the scope of an employee's
duties in cases where there is room for serious debate"5 7 only
exacerbated the confusion." While the Court's reverberation of the basis
for the Pickering-Connick balancing test may seem like mere dicta, it
cannot be understated. Rather, the Court reiterated the now long-held
tenet established in earlier decisions that "the First Amendment protects
a public employee's right . . . to speak as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern." 59 The qualifications necessary for a public employee's
speech to trigger First Amendment protection - that the employee spoke
as a citizen and the speech was a matter of public concern - reflects
precisely why public employees must retain certain free speech rights
that are at the core of the First Amendment. As the Garcetti Court
explicitly stated, "[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct
vibrant dialogue in a democratic society. It suggested, in
addition, that widespread costs may arise when dialogue is
repressed.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 421.
56. In his dissent, Justice Stevens opined that "it is senseless to let
constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall
within a job description. Moreover, it seems perverse to fashion a new rule that
provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking
frankly to their superiors." Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 424 (noting that it was not necessary to set out any guidelines for
analyzing when a public employee's statements were made pursuant to official
duties because both parties in Garcetti acknowledged that Ceballos' memo was
written in his official capacity).
58. Justice Souter warned of the negative effects that would come of the
Court's elusive guidance on this issue, noting that "[i]t sets out a standard that will
not discourage government employers from setting duties expansively, but will
engender litigation to decide which stated duties were actual and which were merely
formal." Id at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 417 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
384 (1987); U.S. v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995)).
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is a matter of considerable significance.,,6o Further, it is the Court's
"responsibility . .. to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental
rights by virtue of working for the government."6' Facilitating
government transparency and accountability is precisely the type of
public concern that "lies at the heart of expression subject to protection
by the First Amendment." 62 This well-established principle of the First
Amendment stresses why the need for courts to engage in balancing,
though difficult at times, is crucial to a complete understanding of
Garcetti and how it ought to be applied going forward.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since Garcetti, several of the circuit courts have had the
opportunity to mold Garcetti's holding into their own version of a solid
legal standard. In light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to proclaim
any sort of straightforward, coherent test63 by which the courts below
were to analyze public employee speech for First Amendment claims in
Garcetti, many courts identified the one factor the Court did not seem to
waver on and ran with it: speech made pursuant to one's official duties is
not protected by the First Amendment.6 With little else to rely on as
concrete instruction when applying Garcetti, the trend among many
circuit courts post-Garcetti has seemingly been to rigorously scrutinize
whether an employee's speech was made pursuant to one's official
duties. After a meticulous search for some indication that the employee
was speaking in his or her official capacity, that factor then becomes
dispositive for the entire case. In making this determination, many
courts use an overly far-reaching definition of when speech can be
60. Id. at 425.
61. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
62. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. This is not a criticism of the Supreme Court's reluctance to do so. Rather,
it merely observes the problems that arise when determinations must be made on a
case-by-case basis because a bright-line test would be inappropriate for such a fact-
based inquiry.
64. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 ("We reject, however, the notion that the First
Amendment shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to
their professional duties.").
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considered pursuant to one's public duties. While speech made in one's
official capacity is certainly an important factor in determining whether a
public employee has a legitimate First Amendment retaliation claim,
giving the term such a vastly broad scope has created a very high hurdle
over which public employees must jump if they are going to successfully
bring a First Amendment retaliation suit. For reasons discussed below,
this yields unsound results.
Two recent decisions exemplify the circuit split that has emerged
since Garcetti. Though the factual contexts of the cases differ, both
involve instances of public employees speaking to the media and
subsequent discipline by their employers. The 2010 First Circuit
decision, Foley v. Town of Randolph,66 broadly applied Garcetti, finding
that because the fire department chief's comments during a press
conference were made in his line of employment, no further balancing
analysis was necessary. On the other end of the spectrum is the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Andrew v. Clark, finding that whether a police
officer acted pursuant to his official duties when he created an internal
memorandum and later released it to the press was a materially disputed
fact. Based on this finding, the Fourth Circuit held that the case could
not be resolved by applying Garcetti alone. The starting point for
determining whether an employee's speech is protected is to ask: (1) was
the employee speaking on a matter of public concern and (2) was the
employee speaking as a citizen?68 As will be discussed below, the Foley
decision is illustrative of the unfortunate trend that has emerged in some
circuits to disproportionately scrutinize whether an employee's speech
was made pursuant to his or her official duties while considering other
65. See Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that a
fire marshal who spoke about the fire department's understaffing and budget cuts at
a press conference spoke pursuant to his official duties); Williams v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a high school football coach
criticizing the management of school athletic funds did so in his official capacity);
Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007) (denying First
Amendment protection to a police officer who spoke out against reductions in the
city's canine-training program); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646 (7th
Cir. 2006) (declining to find a police sergeant's comments to her supervisors that the
chiefs new plan would not work was citizen speech).
66. 598 F.3d 1 (2010).
67. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009).
68. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.
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factors, such as to whom the speech was directed and whether it was a
matter of public concern, to be of secondary importance. Such
imbalanced balancing yields incongruent results, as a comparison of the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Andrew and the First Circuit's decision in
Foley suggests. The courts have been instructed to look beyond official
job descriptions to determine an employee's duties and therefore must
assess situational factors such as the motive behind the speech as well as
the content and context of the speech that would provide insight as to
whether the employee was speaking in his or her official capacity. Only
then can adequate consideration be given to the interests of both the
public employee and the government employer as Pickering, Connick
and their progeny (including Garcetti) articulate.
A. Foley v. Town of Randolph
In the early hours of a spring morning in Randolph,
Massachusetts, Charles Foley, the chief of the Randolph Fire
Department, and others tirelessly worked to combat a fatal fire. Shortly
thereafter, Foley found himself responding to questions from the media
at a press conference held at the site of the fire.70 During the press
conference, Foley fielded questions directly related to the fire itself, but
his comments eventually shifted focus to his concerns about the
inadequate funding and understaffing that plagued the Randolph Fire
Department.7 Soon after that fateful press conference, the town
evaluated Foley's actions and concluded that Foley "made
'inappropriate, inaccurate, intemperate, and misleading statements to the
news media."' 72 Per the hearing officer's recommendation, the Board of
Selectmen voted to take disciplinary action against Foley and suspended
69. Id at 424-25 (recognizing that official job descriptions often do not fully
entail an employee's duties).
70. Foley, 598 F.3d at 2.
71. Id. at 3. Foley's comments criticized the reduction in the fire department's
manpower generally and also as it related to the response to this particular fire.
Additionally, Foley expressed his disapproval of an unsuccessful proposed override
to a Massachusetts statute which limits property tax increases. Id.
72. Id at 4 (quoting a report issued by a town-appointed hearing officer
charged with determining whether there was cause to discipline Foley).
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him for fifteen days without pay. Foley then brought an action against
the town in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts.
The First Circuit applied the two-part inquiry used in Garcetti to
determine if Foley's speech was entitled to First Amendment
protection.74 The First Circuit concluded that Foley's comments about
budget cuts and understaffing were a matter of public concern, leaving
his case to turn on whether he was speaking as a public employee in his
official capacity or as a citizen.75 This inquest, the court observed, was
"a practical one." 76 Despite the fact that Foley was not required to speak
to the media as part of his official job description,77 the First Circuit held
that at the time Foley voiced his opinion to the media, he was speaking
pursuant to his official duties.78 The determination was primarily based
on the fact that he could clearly be identified as the fire chief at the time
of his comments to the press. 7 9 Namely, the First Circuit looked at the
fact that when Foley spoke to the press he was "in uniform and on duty"
and would have readily been considered a representative of the fire
department when he spoke.so This was also not Foley's first time
participating in a press conference. The First Circuit used these details
to support its decision that Foley was speaking in his official capacity
7 3. Id.
74. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (The starting point for determining whether an
employee's speech is protected is to ask: (1) was the employee speaking on a matter
of public concern and (2) was the employee speaking as a citizen?).
75. Foley, 598 F.3d at 10.
76. Id. at 6 (relying on Garcetti to determine whether Foley's statements fell
within the scope of his duties as fire marshal) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
77. The town had previously rejected Foley's request during contract
renegotiations to add a provision to his contract that would authorize him to "make
public statements on matters of public safety." Foley v. Town of Randolph, 601 F.
Supp. 2d 379, 382 (D. Mass. 2009).
78. This is not to say that public officials are not to speak to the public through
the media absent a contract provision explicitly authorizing the activity. Rather, it
merely highlights the limitations of solely relying on an official's job description for
purposes of determining whether an employee's speech is protected by the First
Amendment.
79. Foley, 598 F.3d at 6-7 (noting that the lack of inclusion of the activity in
question as part of one's official job description was not dispositive).
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. at 4. Foley had previously participated in at least one other press
conference, responded to media questions, and made statements to the media. Id.
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because it claimed there was "'no relevant analogue to speech by
citizens.
Foley, on the other hand, saw the situation a bit differently. He
likened his comments at the press conference to similar situations where
local residents, as citizens, had expressed their discontent in newspaper
articles regarding budget and manpower troubles within the fire
department.83 Foley urged that he, too, was speaking as a citizen because
the content of his speech was no longer about the fire that he attempted
to put out but was about his concerns with tax and budget cuts generally.
The court, however, did not agree. The First Circuit refused to give any
weight to the change in context of Foley's comments and instead
concluded that since everything Foley said during the press conference
"was entirely related to matters concerning the Fire Department," he was
. . .84
speaking in his official capacity and not as a citizen.
The First Circuit speculated that Foley directed his concerns to
the media in hopes that "his frustration with the budgetary and staffing
shortfalls of the Department might have reached a greater audience and
had a greater impact than if he voiced his views in another forum."8 5 The
court used this fact to support its position that he spoke in his official
capacity. The court, however, failed to acknowledge that the motivation
behind Foley's speech was also a crucial factor in determining whether
Foley was speaking about a matter of public concern when it neglected to
engage in Pickering-Connick balancing analysis. The driving force
behind Foley's choice to change the focus of his statements at the time
and place he did was so his concerns could be widely received by the
community at a press conference. The fact that Foley addressed the
public rather than made an internal complaint seems to suggest that
Foley's speech was more in line with a concerned citizen speaking on a
public matter rather than a fire chief speaking in his line of
82. Id. at 8 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8. While the First Circuit recognized that "Foley's comments to the
press fall closer to the line of citizen speech than the internal memorandum that
Ceballos submitted to his supervisor in Garcetti," the court declined to find any
aspect of citizen speech with respect to Foley's statements since "it is more likely
that anyone who observed the speech took it to bear the imprimatur of the Fire
Department." Id.
85. Id. at 10.
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employment.86 Here, and in similar cases, the speaker's intent can help
elucidate the court's inquiry into whether the employee was speaking as
a private citizen or in his official capacity. For example, when an
employee speaks to the media, as was the case in both Foley and
Andrew, courts ought to closely examine why the employee chose the
media as his or her outlet. This may be evidence that the employee spoke
as a private citizen, seeking to widely disseminate his or her public
concern. At the very least, honing in on this inquiry will produce sound
conclusions, as evidenced by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Andrew v.
Clark.
B. Andrew v. Clark
Michael Andrew worked for the Baltimore Police Department
(BPD) as a major, a command level rank. One night he was supervising
a police response to an incident in which an elderly man had barricaded
himself in his apartment after killing his landlord. Andrew
recommended that a Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU) enter
the apartment first in order to obtain more information and for police to
continue negotiations with the suspect. TARU officers subsequently
entered the apartment and fatally shot the suspect. The BPD began an
investigation after the shooting. Concerned about the deadly events that
had transpired at the crime scene, Andrew specifically requested several
times that the investigation and review include him, but he was excluded
from the entire investigation. As a result, Andrew drafted a memorandum
86. Though Foley made his comments at a press conference, an unusual
activity for the concerned citizen, it is important to not limit the focus of his speech
so narrowly. Rather, when Foley made his comments to the press at a press
conference, he had the same motivation, and the effect was the same as a letter to the
editor of a local newspaper from any concerned citizen. See, e.g. Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that "the fact of employment is only
tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public
communication made by a teacher, we conclude that it is necessary to regard the
teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.").
87. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2009).
88. Id.
89. Id. Andrew himself was not involved in any of the action at the scene of
the crime. His only role on site was "to supervise the officers assigned to perimeter
street control." Id.
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articulating his apprehension over how TARU had handled the situation
and TARU's use of deadly force, 90 which he then presented to Clark, the
Baltimore police commissioner.9 1 When the police commissioner
disregarded the memorandum entirely, Andrew gave a copy of the
memorandum to a reporter at the Baltimore Sun. The newspaper then
published an article about the shooting that included the concerns
Andrew expressed in his memorandum.92 After the article was
published, the BPD forced Andrew to undergo an Internal Affairs
investigation and charged him with "giving confidential internal
information to the media." 93 Following the investigation, Andrew had to
relinquish control of the BPD's Eastern District and was demoted to a
post in the Evidence Control Unit.9 4 However, Clark's action against
Andrew did not end there. A few months later, he instructed Andrew to
retire. After Andrew unsuccessfully tried to negotiate the dropping of his
Internal Affairs charges in exchange for his retirement, he received paid
time-off and his status was deemed "out of pay" so that when he returned
to work, he did not receive any compensation.
Andrew filed a claim against the BPD, Clark, and other police
officials alleging that the action taken against him by his employers was
retaliation for utilizing his First Amendment right to speak as a citizen on
a matter of public concern when he drafted and submitted his
memorandum to The Baltimore Sun.96 Citing Garcetti, the district court
dismissed Andrew's complaint, finding that his memorandum "never lost
its character as speech pursuant to his official duties simply by virtue of
the wider dissemination he elected to give it after his recommendations
were ignored by the police commissioner." 9 7 The Fourth Circuit
reversed, distinguishing the case at hand from Garcetti because the
90. Id. Andrew did not think the TARU officers were justified in using deadly
force because they had not "exhausted all peaceful non-lethal options and that the
department had unnecessarily placed officers in harm's way." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 264-65.
93. Id. at 265.
94. Id. As part of his demotion, Andrew also no longer received an annual
$3,900 stipend he previously received. Id.
95. Id. During this time Andrew's compensation and benefits were terminated.
Id.
96. Andrew v. Clark, 472 F.Supp.2d 659 (D. Md. 2007).
97. Id. at 662.
parties in Andrew disputed whether Andrew's actions of writing the
memorandum and then sharing it with the press were pursuant to his
official job duties. In Garcetti, the parties agreed that Ceballos'
disposition memo was written as part of his deputy district attorney
duties. 98
The Fourth Circuit also declined to adopt the district court's
understanding that Garcetti "significantly modified the Pickering test
regarding the protection of a public employee's First Amendment right to
speak as a citizen about matters of public concern." 99 The Fourth Circuit
correctly noted that Garcetti had kept in place the two fundamental
inquiries of the Pickering balancing analysis: (1) "whether the [public]
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern" and (2)
whether the government "'had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general public.""oo
Finding that the employee was speaking pursuant to his official duties
was but one relevant factor to consider in the first inquiry, in which case
the employer would be justified in restricting speech affecting the place
of employment.'0o The answer to the first prong of the Pickering analysis
in Garcetti was clear - neither party disputed that the disposition memo
was written as one of Ceballos' deputy district attorney duties. However,
the Fourth Circuit recognized that where the parties do not agree as to
whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee's official duties,
as was the case in Andrew, there remains an unresolved question of fact
whether the employee spoke as a citizen. The Fourth Circuit correctly
observed that Garcetti does not provide the answer in cases like
Andrew.102 It follows, then, that in such instances where a public
98. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (noting that "Ceballos
wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy,
was employed to do").
99. Andrew, 561 F.3d at 268.
100. Id. at 268 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)).
101. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding that "when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline").
102. Andrew, 561 F.3d at 267 ("[B]ecause the parties do not agree that the
facts demonstrate that Andrew wrote his memorandum as part of his official duties .
. . the facts alleged in Andrew's second amended complaint do not 'render Garcetti
wholly applicable."') (quoting Andrew, 472 F.Supp.2d at 663).
660 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 9
2011] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 661
employee does not concede that his or her speech was derived from the
duties he or she was expected to perform, the employee may be entitled
to relief under the First Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit also acknowledged that Garcetti explicitly
declined to define or elaborate on what comprises the scope of an
employee's official duties.10 3 Several circuit courts have recognized this
refusal in Garcetti as expanding the analysis of an employee's official
duties to applying a broad and searching interpretation. 104 The Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, confined this observation to stay consistent
with the true holding of Garcetti in light of the particular facts of that
case. Namely, the Garcetti Court did not elaborate on when an
employee's speech is pursuant to his or her official duties primarily
because it did not have to, not because it was expanding this factor's
importance in the Pickering-Connick balancing analysis or the court's
discretion to define a public employee's official duties. This is consistent
with a narrow interpretation of Garcetti.05 Thus the Fourth Circuit
properly realigned the focus of the relevant inquiries in public employee
First Amendment retaliation claims, seeking to determine whether
Andrew's dissemination of his memorandum was citizen speech
regarding a matter of public concern and, if so, whether the publication
103. Id.
104. See Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir.
2007) (finding that a high school athletics director wrote his memoranda to the
principal and office manager expressing concerns about allocation of school athletic
funds in the course of performing his job); Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472
F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a lab technician who contacted the
testing equipment manufacturer to discuss equipment reliability issues was
unprotected under the First Amendment because the communication was traceable to
her employer); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006)
(interpreting a university employee's report about her supervisor's misconduct to be
unprotected speech made pursuant to her duties of employment); Mills v. City of
Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) (characterizing police sergeant's
comments to other officers after a meeting expressing opposition to a new plan to
move officers in an effort to overcome manpower shortage as "contributing to . .
official policy").
105. The holding in Garcetti therefore suggests that whether speech was made
pursuant to one's official duties is a threshold question for Pickering-Connick
balancing only in cases where that point is conceded from the outset, for only then
can it unequivocally be said that the public employee was not speaking as a citizen
without further analysis.
so negatively affected the operation of the BPD as to outweigh Andrew's
. 106interest in conveying his message.
III. WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS IT RIGHT
As the First Circuit's decision and rationale in Foley exemplifies,
the circuit courts' interpretation of Garcetti has resulted in a trend in
which the courts deem speech to be "pursuant to one's official duties" so
long as the context of the speech is fairly relatable to the employee's line
of work. The evolution of such a broad interpretation has led seemingly
small factors, such as the fact that an employee was in uniform or the
topic of the speech generally relating to one's line of work, to become
dispositive when a court is determining whether the speech was actually
made as part of his or her official duties and thus protected under the
First Amendment. 07 However, as the above analysis of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Andrew illustrates, Garcetti's holding does not stand
for the notion that courts have broad discretion to engage in such far-
reaching exploration in order to define what constitutes an employee's
official duties. Simply because an employee's speech is related to his or
her line of work does not, without more, indicate that the employee was
required to produce that speech in accordance with his or her official job
obligations.'os Such sweeping generalizations misconstrue the purpose of
not protecting statements made pursuant to one's official duties,109
leaving an employee with little to no First Amendment protections when
106. Andrew, 561 F.3d at 268 (noting that even after Garcetti, the First
Amendment may protect a public employee's speech if he or she spoke as a citizen
and if the speech was a matter of public concern).
107. See Foley v. City of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 7 (2010) (using the fact that
Foley "would naturally be regarded as the public face of the Department" as proof
that his speech was made "in his official capacity" despite the fact that he was not
required to speak at the press conferences).
108. In Garcetti, there is no doubt that Ceballos wrote the disposition
memoranda because his job required him to do so. Had he not written the
memoranda, he would not have been performing his official duties as the deputy
district attorney. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
109. In Garcetti, the Court noted that "[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
421-22.
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an employer takes retaliatory disciplinary action based on a sheer dislike
for the employee's comments regardless of the context of those
statements. As others have observed, and as will be discussed below,
neglecting to engage in a more thorough balancing analysis has
dangerous ramifications for government accountability as well as the
general atmosphere of the government workplace. In a broader sense,
it also poses a serious threat to established First Amendment principles
that promote democratic self-governance, such as free and open public
debate and an unfettered marketplace of ideas.
To be sure, not all of public employee speech is guaranteed
protection under the First Amendment. Certainly government employers
have a strong interest in an efficient, conflict-free work environment and
ought to be able to structure the workplace in a way that best suits that
interest. Thus, when an employee's speech is the product of his or her
official duties in the workplace, the employer has discretion to take such
disciplinary action as he or she sees fit. As the Supreme Court in
Garcetti observed, "[o]fficial communications have official
consequences.""' However, it does not then follow that a government
employer has carte blanche to regulate and restrict employee speech in
all situations, even if that speech ultimately has the effect of casting a
negative shadow over the workplace. The court's role in these cases is to
balance "the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."1 12
In the post-Garcetti decisions, many courts have strayed from a
proper undertaking of the Pickering-Connick balancing analysis that
remained in full force even after Garcetti in favor of attempting to apply
Garcetti's alleged new "bright-line rule." 1 l3 In doing so, several lower
110. Elizabeth M. Ellis, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Left to Decide
"Your Conscience or Your Job," 41 IND. L. REV. 187 (2008); The Supreme Court,
2005 Term: Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 273 (2006); see also, Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt seems perverse to fashion a new rule
that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before
talking frankly to their superiors.").
111. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
112. Andrew, 561 F.3d at 268 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 142).
113. Norton suggests that in Garcetti
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courts have oversimplified the holding of Garcetti's denial of First
Amendment protection to statements an employee makes in his or her
official capacity.114 While it is true that speech not deemed citizen
speech does not receive rigorous First Amendment protection,"' whether
a public employee's statements were actually made pursuant to his or her
official duties remains a critical inquiry to which courts must give
sufficient consideration. The relative ease with which the Supreme
Court reached its conclusion in Garcetti regarding this issue does not
signify that lower courts may now do the same in all cases. The Garcetti
court readily found that Ceballos wrote his disposition memo pursuant to
his official duties because both parties conceded as much. Courts that
interpret this to mean Garcetti "significantly expanded government's
already substantial power over public employee speech"' 17 misconstrue
the holding of Garcetti by applying it to cases that differ substantially"t8
from the facts on which the Garcetti Court based its decision.119 Solely
focusing on finding any possible way in which the employee's speech
could be construed as arising from his or her official duties turns the
[T]he Court created a bright-line rule that essentially defines
government workers' speech pursuant to their official duties as
the government's own speech - i.e., speech that the
government has bought and thus may control, regardless of the
strength of the public's interest in it or its impact, if any, on
governmental efficiency.
Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L.
REv. 75, 75 (2008).
114. Public employees' speech pursuant to their official duties indicates that
they are not speaking as private citizens. Because they are not speaking as a citizen,
the first prong of the Pickering analysis is not fulfilled, and the speech is, therefore,
not entitled to First Amendment protection. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
115. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (noting that a public employee's speech
may be protected by the First Amendment provided that he or she was speaking as a
citizen "outside the course of performing their official duties").
116. Id. at 424 ("[T]he parties in this case do not dispute that Ceballos wrote
his disposition memo pursuant to his employment duties.").
117. Norton, supra note 113, at 75-76.
118. Unlike the parties in Garcetti, the parties in subsequent cases often do not
concede to the fact that the speech was made pursuant to the employee's official
duties.
119. The Court in Garcetti went on to say that it had "no occasion to articulate
a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee's duties in cases
where there is room for serious debate." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
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well-established Pickering-Connick balancing test into little more than a
misguided scavenger hunt.120 Furthermore, when the parties are in
dispute over whether the speech was actually made pursuant to an
employee's official duties, it is imperative that the court delve further
into the underlying facts of the matter before it denies relief to the public
employee and dismisses the retaliation claim for involving speech
unprotected by the First Amendment.
A. Garcetti Must be Narrowly Applied In Disputed Factual Situations
While Garcetti has created a good deal of uncertainty and
inconsistency among the lower courts, the Supreme Court made one
thing clear: the relevant starting point for assessing whether a public
employee's statements potentially merit First Amendment protection is
to determine whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter
of public concern at the time the statements were made.12 As previously
mentioned, the lower courts in Garcetti did not have to extensively pour
over the record to reach the conclusion that Ceballos' disposition memo
had been written in his official capacity - both parties conceded that
writing disposition memos was in fact, among other things, what
Ceballos was hired to do.122 In Garcetti, it was unmistakable from the
outset that the production of the memo stemmed directly from Ceballos'
duties as supervising deputy district attorney.
In subsequent cases courts have followed suit, examining
whether public employees made statements as citizens or in their official
capacities. However, reaching a determination has not always been as
apparent as it was in Garcetti. Much to the contrary, these cases often
120. The Supreme Court did not need to go as far as the balancing test because
it was apparent from the outset that the Ceballos did not speak as a citizen in
Garcetti. Some circuit courts mistook this to mean that a mere suggestion that the
speech was "pursuant to one's official duties" was conclusive. See supra note 104
and accompanying text.
121. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417 (noting that "Pickering provides a useful
starting point in explaining the Court's doctrine"). See also Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (proffering two inquiries to guide courts' analysis of
protected public employee speech: (1) determining whether the employee spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern and (2) assessing the employer's interest in
disallowing the statements in question).
122. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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involve a dispute over the context of the public employee's speech.
When the parties do not agree on whether the employee was speaking as
a citizen or in his or her official capacity, courts cannot look to Garcetti
for guidance and grant summary judgment for the employer.1 2 3 While
several lower courts have either overlooked or ignored the crucial factual
distinctions between Garcetti and subsequent cases,124 the Andrew court
was careful to emphasize the significance of such discrepancies. 125 It
would be premature, the Andrew court reasoned, to presume that an
employee made statements in his or her official capacity without
examining the content, context, and nature of the statements made where
an employee asserts that he or she was speaking as a citizen.126
The Andrew court flatly rejected the notion that Garcetti
expanded a government employer's ability to suppress the speech of its
employees.127 Going forward, it is important for courts to follow the
Fourth Circuit's example and keep in mind the fact-specific
123. Summary judgment can only be granted when there is "no genuine
dispute as to any material fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
124. See Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693-94 (5th Cir.
2007) (affirming judgment where athletic department employee wrote memo
complaining about athletics funding); Foley v. Town of Randolph, 601 F.Supp.2d
379 (D. Mass. 2009) (granting summary judgment to defendants on Foley's First
Amendment claim), aff'd, 598 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2010); Boykin v. City of Baton
Rouge, 439 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (M.D. La. 2006) (applying Garcetti to grant
summary judgment where plaintiff wrote diversity report pursuant to job
description); Levy v. Office of Legislative Authority, 459 F.Supp.2d 494, 498-99
(M.D. La. 2006) (granting summary judgment where plaintiffs speech at an event
outside his place of employment was made pursuant to his official duties); Ruotolo
v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5045 (SHS), 2006 WL 2033662, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 19, 2006) (granting summary judgment for defendants where police sergeant
plaintiffs report concerning environmental hazards was made pursuant to official
duties), affd, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008).
125. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[B]ecause the
parties do not agree that the facts demonstrate that Andrew wrote his memorandum
as part of his official duties, contrary to the district court's conclusion, the facts
alleged in Andrew's second amended complaint do not 'render Garcetti wholly
applicable."' (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 472 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (D.Md. 2007))).
126. See Andrew, 561 F.3d at 267.
127. Id. at 268 ("We disagree with the district court's conclusion that Garcetti
significantly modified the Pickering test regarding the protection of a public
employee's First Amendment right to speak as a citizen about matters of public
concern.").
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characteristics of Garcetti that illuminated the lack of First Amendment
protection for Ceballos' memorandum when applying Garcetti in
subsequent cases.128 When the allegation that a public employee was
speaking pursuant to his or her official duties is contested, summary
judgment is not warranted and courts must engage in a more in-depth,
129fact-intensive analysis to make a determination on the issue.
B. Applying the Pickering-Connick Balancing Test Yields Results That
Better Reflect the Totality of the Circumstances and are More
Consistent With First Amendment Principles
One of the requirements when a public employee brings a First
Amendment retaliation claim is that the public employee must speak as a
citizen at the time he or she made the statements that allegedly prompted
the employer to take retaliatory disciplinary action. When a court finds
that a public employee was speaking in his or her official capacity, it can
certainly be said that there may be evidence that he or she was not
speaking as a private citizen. However, it is not the only relevant factor
to consider when deciding if speech is citizen speech or unprotected
public employee speech. Even the Garcetti Court was careful to point
out that the fact that Ceballos' speech concerned his employment was not
dispositive.130 If courts came to rely on an employee speaking pursuant
to his or her official duties as the dispositive factor when assessing
whether the employee spoke as a citizen, incongruence would result.131
128. Namely, it was apparent that Ceballos' disposition memo was prepared as
part of his duties as supervising deputy district attorney.
129. A few courts have taken this approach, denying summary judgment
because of the parties' factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff was speaking as an
employee. See Trujillo v. Bd. of Educ., 212 F. App'x 760, 766-67 (10th Cir. 2007);
Jackson v. Jimino, No. 1:03-CV-722 (RFT), 2007 WL 189311, at * 1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan.
19, 2007); Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857, 867-68 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
130. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
131. Consider Connick, for example. Surely an assistant district attorney was
not acting in her official capacity when she distributed a questionnaire to the office
seeking her co-workers' opinions on the office transfer policy. While the Court in
Connick found her questionnaire unprotected by the First Amendment because it was
not a matter of public concern, this just demonstrates the importance of taking all
relevant factors into consideration when engaging in the balancing analysis and not
heightening the significance of any one factor. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983).
Rather, a more thorough balancing of all relevant factors results in sound
policy and overall fairness.
The rationale behind protecting citizen speech but not speech
that is inseparably a product of the public employee's job duties relates
back to the government's interest in a maintaining an efficient and
peaceful workplace. Yet there is another interest at stake - the
employee's right to free speech - and to deem the employee's interest
to be of lesser significance because of a purported "bright-line test"
(which, as we have seen, is not what the Garcetti Court pronounced it to
be) will have detrimental effects. 13 Additionally, it is wholly
inconsistent with recognized First Amendment principles. As Justice
Souter keenly recognized in his dissent in Garcetti, "[o]pen speech by a
private citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the heart of
expression subject to protection by the First Amendment."' 33
The Fourth Circuit's approach is similar to that of the Ninth
Circuit's rationale in the Garcetti case before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. There, the Ninth Circuit observed that a bright-line rule that
barred First Amendment protection of public employees' statements
made pursuant to one's job responsibilities would undoubtedly lead to
injurious effects. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted that such a rule
would "seriously undermine our ability to maintain the integrity of our
132. The Garcetti Court even observed that "[e]xposing governmental
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance." Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 425.
133. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997)). Public employees cannot be
"compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with [their place of
employment]." Pickering v. Bd of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (holding that "[i]ndiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary
power," which violates due process); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(holding that "[t]he statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom
goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate
inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers"); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding the statutes invalid "insofar as they proscribe
mere knowing membership without any showing of specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of the Communist Party of the United States or of the State of New
York").
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governmental operations."l34 Justice Stevens echoed this sentiment in
his dissent in Garcetti, pointing to the danger of "let[ting] constitutional
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a
job description."13 The resistance to engage in arbitrary line-drawing
regarding when an employee is or is not speaking as a citizen is driven
by the underlying notion that while speech similar to Andrew's and
Foley's may create some temporary discomfort in the office, when all is
said and done, there are far greater benefits derived from allowing this
speech to become part of the marketplace of ideas. When a public
employee addresses the public about misconduct, inefficiencies, or other
concerns related to the workplace, the employee's statements serve as a
useful tool in promoting and enforcing government accountability.136
The public employee is one of a privileged few who happen to be in this
unique position to serve as a liaison between the government and the
public, capable of sharing valuable information and a distinct
perspective. Thus, there is all the more reason the courts should be
careful to protect speech that serves this purpose where it would not
seriously impede the government's interests.
In order to fully appreciate the significance of this type of
speech, it is also important to note that the public employee's right to
free speech and the government's right to an efficient workplace
environment are not the only interests at stake in First Amendment
retaliation cases. Another interest that ought to be taken into
consideration when courts endeavor in the balancing analysis, though
134. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S.
410 (2006).
135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. In his concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson observes that the duty of the
public employee to inform the public of governmental problems has become all the
more imperative in recent years. Due to the changing nature of today's news
organizations,
[t]he in-depth investigative report, so essential to exposure of
public malfeasance, may seem a luxury even in the best of
economic times, because such reports take time to develop and
involve many dry (and commercially unproductive) runs. And
in these most difficult of times, not only investigative
coverage, but substantive reports on matters of critical public
policy are increasingly shortchanged.
Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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perhaps more implicitly, is the general public's interest "in receiving the
well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion." 3 7 Deciding cases the way the court did in Foley does not
give adequate consideration to the general public's interest in obtaining
this information. In fact, it undermines one of the most fundamental
principles of the right to free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 1 Speech that informs the public about government
problems and inefficiencies does not lose any of its worth simply
because the speaker happens to work for the government. 14 0 Much to the
contrary, public employees are often the ones in the best position to
inform the general public about issues in government operations.
Placing arbitrary limits on when public employees are allowed to convey
such messages does a disservice to both the public employee and the
general public as well.
IV. WHEN IS SPEECH "PURSUANT TO ONE'S OFFICIAL DUTIES"?
Despite the substantial interests of public employees and the
general public that weigh in favor of protecting a public employee's
speech on a matter of public concern, proper consideration must be given
to the interests of the government employer as well. With variant
interests at stake, the intricacies of a court's balancing analysis are likely
to be complex and may even seem contrived at times. Yet there is a true
difference between a government employer's interest in restricting an
137. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
138. Not taking the public's interest into consideration is also inconsistent with
Garcetti itself. The Supreme Court in Garcetti explicitly recognized "the
importance of promoting the public's interest in receiving the well-informed views
of government employees engaging in civic discussion." Id.
139. One of the basic principles of the First Amendment is to protect "free and
open debate . . . vital to informed decision-making by the electorate." See Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (emphasizing the importance of school
employees being able to speak out about how funds should be spent without fear of
retaliation).
140. "[A] government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to an
individual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for
categorically discounting a speaker's interest in commenting on a matter of public
concern just because the government employs him." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428-29
(Souter, J., dissenting).
670 [Vol. 9
2011] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 671
employee's speech because it will cause workplace disruption and the
employer's interest in restricting speech of societal significance simply
because the employer would prefer it not to occur.
A. Narrowing the Scope of "Official Capacity "
There are and will continue to be instances where speech falling
into the latter category is fairly traceable to the employee's line of work
such that a court, using Garcetti's purported new test, could find it to be
"pursuant to one's official duties" and therefore unprotected citizen
speech. However, only a narrow analysis of when speech is made in
one's official capacity is consistent with both Garcetti and the Pickering-
Connick balancing analysis. Thus, the relevant question when
determining if a public employee's speech was pursuant to his or her
official duties is whether it was part of the employee's job. Where the
answer to this question is in the negative, it does not necessarily indicate
that the First Amendment protects the public employee's speech. It is
merely an indication to go forward with Pickering-Connick balancing.
Yet determining whether speech came into existence because it
was part of a public employee's job is not always a simple task. As the
Garcetti Court observed:
Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the
listing of a given task in an employee's written job description
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that
conducting the task is within the scope of the employee's141
professional duties for First Amendment purposes.
As courts have been instructed to look outside official job
descriptions, many have made tenuous assessments to find evidence that
a public employee's speech was the product of his or her job, as was
literally the case in Garcetti, when its content relates to one's
employment.142 However, adopting an exceedingly broad interpretation
141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
142. See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2010) (finding
that a fire marshal who spoke about the fire department's understaffing and budget
cuts at a press conference spoke pursuant to his official duties); Spiegla v. Hull, 481
F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that "there is not a 'constitutional cause of action
behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her
job"') (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480
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of what the Garcetti Court meant by "pursuant to one's official duties"
leads to an incomplete analysis of the speech at issue for First
Amendment purposes. Thus, a more thorough analysis of all the relevant
surrounding circumstances will yield sound results while holding true to
Garcetti.43
B. The Media
The relevant surrounding circumstances and the context in which
an employee spoke will undoubtedly vary on a case-by-case basis,
making it near impossible to formulate a workable bright-line rule to
determine when an employee spoke in his or her official capacity.
However, when a public employee makes statements to the media, it can
arguably be presumed that that employee is not "performing his or her
job duties."'44 Of course, this will not hold universally true. Though
speaking to the press bears more of a resemblance to whistleblower
action, there will undoubtedly be times where speaking to the press is
145precisely what an employee was hired to do. However, absent a
showing to the contrary, courts ought to view situations involving
F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that a high school athletics director wrote his
memoranda to the principal and office manager expressing concierns about allocation
of school athletic funds in the course of performing his job); Haynes v. City of
Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the police officer was
acting in his capacity as a public employee and therefore his speech was not
protected under the First Amendment); Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d
794 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a lab technician who contacted the testing
equipment manufacturer to discuss equipment reliability issues was unprotected
under the First Amendment because the communication was traceable to her
employer); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006)
(characterizing police sergeant's comments to other officers after a meeting
expressing opposition to a new plan to move officers in an effort to overcome
manpower shortage as "contributing. . . official policy").
143. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen ... the employee is
simply performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of
scrutiny [compared to speech made as a citizen addressing a matter of public
concern]." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. The Court also instructed that determining a
public employee's job duties is a practical inquiry. Id. at 424.
144. See id. at 423.
145. It is also possible to imagine a particularly disgruntled employee
lamenting his purely workplace-related woes to the press in a grandiose attempt to
inform the general public about his personal plight.
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statements to the media as strong contextual evidence that the motivating
factor behind the employee's statement was to disseminate vital
information to the public and is thus separable from the employee's
official duties.146 Compare Ceballos' disposition memorandum with
Foley's press conference and Andrew's memorandum. Ceballos did not
write his internal memorandum to expose instances of police misconduct
to the general public. Rather, he admittedly wrote because "that is part
of what he ... was employed to do."l 4 7 This is what the Garcetti Court
meant when it held that a Government employer could restrict "speech
that owe[d] its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities."l48 On the other hand, both Foley and Andrew spoke to
the press in order to communicate a matter of public concern to the
general public.149 That their statements were related to their line of work
does not necessarily indicate that they were speaking pursuant to their
official duties. One of the important distinctions courts must make in
assessing First Amendment retaliation claims is whether the speech is
nothing more than a disgruntled employee complaining about office
policy or if it bears on "a question of real public importance."' 50 When
146. In fact, a few courts have already started to make this distinction. See,
e.g., Meenan v. Harrison, 264 F. App'x 146 (3rd Cir. 2007) (finding a police
officer's statements to a reporter concerning the sufficiency of another officer's
investigation was not a required task he was expected to perform, thus amounting to
citizen speech); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 2007) (deciding
employees' complaints about health and safety concerns at a firing range made up
the chain of command were pursuant to their official duties); Freitag v. Ayers, 468
F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between a female corrections officer's
internal reports as part of her official duties and a letter written to a director outside
her place of employment as not written in her official capacity); Jackson v. Jimino,
506 F. Supp. 2d 105 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding an employee's letters written on
official letterhead did not amount to citizen speech but subsequent statements to the
press did warrant First Amendment protection).
147. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
148. Id.
149. Justice Wilkinson also made note of this distinction, observing that
Garcetti did not involve any statements made to the media. Andrew v. Clark, 561
F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (noting that "the matter
about which Andrew spoke was not just an office quarrel or routine personnel
action").
150. Id.
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an employee goes to the press, courts must carefully pause to consider if
the employee truly spoke as part of his or her job in such a context.
While an employee speaking to the press is evidence that the
employee was speaking about a matter of public concern, allowing this
presumption also has negative consequences. As Justice Stevens
observed, doing so may give employees a "perverse . . . incentive" to
"voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their
superiors."s This is certainly a legitimate concern, but it is better than
the alternative: leaving such speech unprotected, which would run the
risk of having a chilling effect on vital reports of government
misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Garcetti was the result of
very specific facts, leaving the Pickering-Connick balancing analysis
wholly intact. Subsequent lower court decisions, however, have parsed
apart the language and underlying rationale of Garcetti, leaving an
atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty surrounding public employee
free speech rights. As decisions stray farther and farther away from
traditional notions of balancing, negative consequences to the public
employee, the Government, and the general public will abound. The
lower courts must narrowly interpret Garcetti and continue to balance the
interests of the employee and the government, as Pickering, Connick,
and even Garcetti instruct. Though neither Garcetti nor its precedents
proffered much guidance as to precisely how to proceed with this
balancing inquiry, courts should follow the example set by the Fourth
Circuit in Andrew and focus on contextual questions such as: why the
employee spoke, how the employee spoke, what the employee spoke
about, and whether the speech is likely to cause serious workplace
disruption or negatively affect the employee's work performance.
Asking these questions will help courts distinguish between important
speech that the First Amendment protects and what amounts to little
more than disgruntled employee grievances. As a result, courts will
achieve more sound results and a more equitable balancing analysis.
151. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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